ABSTRACT Given a large graph, like a social network, which k nodes should be immunized (or removed) to make the network safe from the spread of a virus? This is the node immunization problem. One of the classical methods, inspired by immunology, in analyzing this problem relies on the calculation of the largest eigenvalue before and after immunization in order to create the largest difference in eigenvalue. We propose a method that does not rely on a costly calculation of eigenvalues; instead, we rely on the notion of proxies and deterministic routing areas in order to find such nodes to immunize. We show that our results are consistent with the notion of vulnerability and produces equivalent results when compared with the existing algorithms. Furthermore, experimental results show that when a virus is not allowed to die out (controlled by the strength of the virus), our algorithm ensures that more nodes are safe from infection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given a large graph, we wish to find the best k nodes to immunize, or remove, in order to protect the remaining nodes from the spread of a malicious attack. This problem can be applied to many applications such as the spread of a virus, malware attacks, and even social network analysis. In the node immunization problem, we look at what measure best captures a graphs robustness to infection and what determines if a virus will propagate or dissipate. Unfortunately, when dealing with large graphs, we cannot rely on basic eigenvalue calculations to analyze the problem due to the time it requires to calculate the largest eigenvalue. Instead, we wish to use, ideally, linear time algorithms to speed up the calculations and allow it to scale with the ever increasing size of certain networks such as social networks.
Recently Chen, et al. [2] defined the notion of Vulnerability to measure the graphs likelihood of becoming infected by calculating the largest eigenvalue of the network graph. Then by finding, and removing, k nodes such that the difference in eigenvalues of the original graph and the new graph is maximized, [2] showed that this method gives an intuitive solution to the problem and that it can be done in linear time with their algorithm NetShield.
While this method is able to find such k nodes that will maximize the difference in the largest eigenvalues of the before and after immunization graphs, it is reliant on an approximation method and furthermore, requires the calculation of the first eigenvalue. On the other hand, the method of proxies [1] uses a subset of cut nodes, called proxies, to establish subgraphs called Deterministic Routing Areas. While the primary use of this method is for speeding up the shortest path algorithms, a direct correlation can be made between proxies and the nodes we wish to immunize. Since proxies are a subset of cut-nodes, immunizing them creates separated graphs such that no virus can spread from one group to the other. Furthermore, [1] has shown that approximately one third of the nodes in a graph are proxies, giving us many choices of nodes to select from, and can reduce the size of the graph considerably. Unfortunately, for the immunization problem, one third of a very large network is very expensive to immunize (cost of extensive vigilance, cost of medicine), so we propose a novel weighting measure to ensure that the best k nodes are selected as proxies. Since proxies must be immunized, we can then use simpler techniques to find more nodes, if necessary, to immunize in each DRA.
The main contribution of this paper will the use of proxies and DRAs to find the most optimal nodes to immunize such that the rest of the network is safe from an attack. Furthermore, these nodes will create an optimal reduction in the Vulnerability score since the removal of said proxies will create isolated subgraphs that have no connection to another set since the largest eigenvalue is closely related to the connectedness of a graph. And finally, since each DRA is much smaller in size compared to the original graph, many algorithms that are not suitable for very large graphs can be applied to the smaller DRA to gather more information about the original graph as a whole.
We accomplish these results without the use of calculation the largest eigenvalue for a large graph and rely on a simple tree graph in order to obtain the information. Furthermore, we show that our results are comparable to [2] when we allow the virus to die out. Conversely, when we increase the strength (infectivity) of the virus, we show that our method secures more nodes when compared to [2] . As a result, we believe our method can allow for quarantining of nodes to prevent a deadly infection from destroying every node. We use real world data sets and simulate the spread of the virus using the SIS model and compare the results to NetShield to illustrate the effectiveness of our method.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II gives the relate work and Section III gives the definitions. Our approach is given in Section IV and the experimental results in Section V. Finally, our conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we look at some of the related work on the node immunization problem. There are many papers that deal with the issue of virus propagation and epidemic thresholds for full cliques [7] , for power-law graphs [8] , and studies of heuristics for immunization policies [9] . Wang et al. [9] and its follow up work ( [10] - [12] ) looked at the epidemic threshold for arbitrary graphs. Other approaches to the immunization problem were done by Tong et al. [13] by looking at edge manipulation. Prakash et al. [14] approached the online network immunization based on self-similar selection. References [15] and [16] looked at the reverse engineering of immunization problems, while ([12] , [17] - [19] ) studied the theory about determining epidemic in the network, algorithms about effective immunization, reverse engineering and node immunization given uncertain data.
We cannot study the effects of eigenvalues in a graph without mentioning spectral graph analysis pioneered by Fiedler [20] , as well as numerous other works ( [21] - [24] ), which all use the eigenvectors of the graph (or Laplacian) to find communities in the graph.
Another approach is the influence maximization which, like node immunization, attempts to find a subset of nodes to affect the influence spread in the graph. They are different in the sense that node immunization tries to minimize the spread by removing nodes and changing the structure of the graph, while influence maximization tries to choose an optimal subset of seeds to maximize the 'infected' population. This work was pioneered by Kempe et al. [25] and follow up work to address the NP-hard problem and scalability were done in ( [26] - [30] ).
We also look at several general graph mining techniques that have come into use. Pattern and law mining [31] , [32] , frequent substructure discovery ( [33] , [34] ), community mining and graph partition [35] , [36] , proximity ( [37] - [39] ), bridgeness-based detection of fuzzy communities [40] , network value of a customer [41] , bridge centrality [25] , graph blocker [43] , connectivity of the small world [42] , etc, are only some of the representative work currently being done. Research about sampling in graphs show that influential nodes can be identified by using only a small portion of the nodes in a network.
Finally, we look at measuring the importance of nodes on graphs. There are many measurements such as betweenness centrality based on shortest path [44] and random walks [45] , PageRank [46] , HITS [47] , and coreness score [48] . It is to be noted that these measurements were not originally designed for our problem and thus give sub-optimal immunization results. Moreover, several of these measurements do not scale up for large graphs. While it is clear that our algorithm was not originally intended to solve the node immunization problem as well, we show that it is capable of producing the same results as [2] .
III. PRELIMINARY
For convenience, we provide the basic graph theory concepts and terminology as follows:
A. GRAPH THEORY Graphs: A weighted undirected graph is defined as G(V , E, w) where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges, and w is a weight function.
and w s = w, ∀e ⊆ E. That is, a subgraph H contains a subset of nodes and edges from graph G.
Neighbors: A node v is a neighbor of node u if there exists an edge (u, v) 
Degree: The degree of a node, denoted deg(v), v ∈ V , is the total number of neighbors.
Paths: A simple path ρ is a sequence of nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n with no repeated nodes and for each
Cycles: A simple cycle ρ is a sequence of nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n where v 1 = v n . The length of a path or cycle ρ is the sum of the weights of its constituent edges, ie,
A node is reachable to another one if there exists a path between these two nodes.
Connected Components: A connected component (or CC) of a graph is a subgraph in which any two nodes are connected by a path and is connected to no additional node. A graph is connected if it has exactly one connected component, consisting of the entire graph.
Cut-Nodes and Bi-Connected Components:
A cut-node of a graph is a node whose removal increases the number of connected components in the graph. A bi-connected component (or BCC) of a graph is a subgraph consisting of a maximal set of edges such that any two edges in the set must lie on a common simply cycle.
B. TERMINOLOGY
The following are the concepts provided by [1] and [2] :
Vulnerability: Vulnerability is defined to be a measure of the graph that shows how likely/easily that a graph will be infected by a virus.
Shield-Value: Shield-value is defined on a a subset of nodes that measure how important they are in terms of maintaining the Vulnerability measure of the graph, ie, how much less vulnerable will the graph be if these nodes are removed.
Proxies: Given a node u in a graph G, we say u is a routing proxy of a set of nodes, denoted by A u if and only if: 1) node u ∈ A u is reachable to any node of A u in G, 2) all neighbors of any node v ∈ A u u are in A u , and 3) the size |A u | of A u is equal to or less than c √ |V | , where c is a small constant number, usually 2 or 3. Deterministic Routing Areas: A node u may be a proxy of multiple set of nodes
is the deterministic routing area (DRA) of proxy u.
Maximal Proxies: A proxy u is maximal if there exists no other proxies v such that v = u and
It is important to mention that without the size restriction in the definition of proxies, DRA's will simply be CCs. Thankfully, [1] have shown that proxies and DRAs are well defined, along with various properties regarding them.
C. VULNERABILITY
For Vulnerability, we will use the results of [6] for the SIS model, in which each node would have one of the two following states: susceptible and infected. Susceptible nodes can be infected by infected nodes with infection rate b at each time stamp with host-recovery rate d. According to [6] the epidemic thresholds of arbitrary cascade models on arbitrary networks can be determined by the largest eigenvalue of the network's connectivity matrix. Thus, just like [2] , we will use the largest eigenvalue λ as the Vulnerability score.
IV. OUR APPROACH
The problem we wish to solve is finding the best nodes to immunize in order to prevent the spread of a virus in a network while being limited by a budget k (number of vaccines, cost of protection, etc). Methods that have analyzed eigenvalues and found nodes that maximized the eigenvalue difference have seen success in solving this problem, but suffer from the cost of evaluating eigenvalues of large graphs. We will use the method of proxies to find the best k nodes to immunize and show that these nodes create an optimal reduction in eigenvalue. Furthermore, our method relies on a weight measure to determine which nodes we should select, and thus, we can extend our method to allow for the inclusion of a weighted graph. Although weighted graphs are typically defined as having a weighted edge, we can define the weight to be the importance of specific nodes we wish to secure.
We will use a modified approach to the method of proxies to identify proxies such that each DRA satisfies a given weight criteria as well as being confined to the limits of the budget k. Let us first define the BC-SKETCH graph from [1] :
The BC-SKETCH graph G(V, E, ω) of a graph G(V , E) is a bipartite graph, in which 1) V = V c ∪ V bc such that V c is the set of cut-nodes in G, and V bc is the set of BCCs in G; 2) for each cut node v ∈ V c and each BCC y b ∈ V bc , there exists an edge (v, y b ) ∈ E if and only if v is a cut-node of each BCC y b ; and 3) ω is a weight function such that for each node y b ∈ V bc , ω(y b ) is the number of nodes of G in BCC y b . In order to allow for weight measures of each node, let us define ω as:
Definition 1: Define ω, the weight function in BC-SKETCH, as ω = y∈V bc deg(y)
The main property of this BC-SKETCH graph is that there are no cycles, and [1] have already presented this in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: BC-SKETCH graphs have no cycles, which implies that they are simply trees.
Proof: See [1] .
Algorithm 1 CreateBC Input : Graph G, deg(v)
Output: BC-SKETCH graph G(V, E, ω) 1 Find all cut-nodes of V c and BCC nodes V bc of G ; 2 Build the BC-SKETCH graph G(V, E, ω) with V = V c ∪ V bc ;
A. ALGORITHM Algorithm 1 requires the graph G and the degree of each node as inputs. For finding the cut-nodes and BCCs of a graph, we will use the linear-time algorithm developed by Cormen et al. [3] and Hopcroft and Tarjan [4] . CreateBC outputs the BC-SKETCH graph G to be used as the main input for Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 takes in as an input the BC-SKETCH from Algorithm 1 and a maximum budget k. The idea behind Algorithm 2 is fairly intuitive. Starting from one cut node,
then all of its neighboring BCCs are merged into one BCC (lines 7-13), otherwise we add the cut node to a list of potential proxies V . Unfortunately, due to the way the weights of each BCC is calculated, it is possible that more than k proxies may be found, also, there exists a possibility of two proxies having an edge that connects them. Since it would be redundant to immunize two proxies connected by an edge, we remove the proxy with the lower weight between the two (line 16). With our selection of α, this ensures that the total number of proxies will be at most k.
Algorithm 2 ExtractProxy
Input : BC-SKETCH graph G(V, E, ω) of graph G, deg (v) , budget k Output: Proxies 1 Initialize V to be empty ; 2 let F be the set of cut-nodes with single non-leaf neighbors in G ; 3 while F is not empty do 4 pick a cut-node v in F; 5 let X be the neighbors of v;
merge all BCC nodes in X and v into one BCC node y n ; 9 let ω(y n ) = α ;
10
Replace the non-leaf node in X with y n ;
11
Add to F the cut node neighbors of y n with single non-leaf neighbors ; 12 (v) . Define L to be the graph Laplacian of G whose diagonal entries are the degree of each node. WLOG, we can re-arrange the entries such that the sum of the diagonals in each block is less than or equal to α. Consider these blocks as DRA's and the nodes that connect them to be proxies. Note that this creates 2k proxies. Since the final step of Alg. 2 removes one of the connected components, we are simply left with at most k proxies. We will illustrate this algorithm with an example: Example 1: Consider the graph G presented in Fig. 1 . We wish to find the BC-SKETCH G and the k ≤ 5 best proxies. Figure 2 shows the result of Algorithm 1. One thing to note here is that the leaf nodes present in Figure 1 are all merged into one BCC. Since it is very unlikely that immunizing a terminating node will result in better performance, we can conclude that no leaf node should be immunized and thus it is safe to merge them all into one. Observant readers will be aware that BC05 is missing from the Figure 2 . The reason for that is BC05 corresponds to node 19 which is an isolated node seen in Figure 3 , which corresponds to a node that is in two successive connected components. For this example, nodes {3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 19, 20} are the cut nodes. For node 3, its neighbors will be BC01 and BC07, whose weights are listed in Table 1 . α = 12 meaning it is beyond the limit posed by our budget of k = 5, and thus, node 3 is removed from the list of cut nodes. This continues for nodes 6, 8, 10, and 12. For node 16, α = 8 meaning we merged BC08, BC04, and node 16 into one BCC called y 1 , and we repeat the process with the new BCC until all the cut nodes have been exhausted. We end with V = {3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 20} as the list of possible proxies. Finally, we remove nodes 6 and 12 since they have an existed edge connecting among the proxies and they are of lower weight. In the end, we finally have V = {3, 8, 10, 20} as the final list. 
B. RELATION TO VULNERABILITY
Recall that we are using the largest eigenvalue of the graph, as used by [2] and [6] , as a measure of vulnerability and that our goal is to maximize the difference after immunization. Although our approach does not use eigenvalues, we still want to know if our method creates an optimal difference in said eigenvalues. A graph that is well connected will have a high eigenvalue which means it is less robust to virus attacks. Ideally, the removal of every cut node would maximize the difference in the largest eigenvalue of the original and immunized graph since all we would be left with is isolated nodes and connected components. And so, by removing proxies, which are a subset of cut nodes, we have the best case scenario for this largest difference.
A theorem by Cauchy [5] shows us how the eigenvalues are related when removing one or more proxies from a graph.
Theorem 1: Let B be a principal submatrix of A of order n − 1 with eigenvalues µ 1 ≥ µ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ n−1 . Then 
Unfortunately we cannot say with certainty that this will produce the maximum difference in the largest eigenvalue before and after immunization, only that the largest eigenvalue will decrease with each successive removal of a proxy and the above theorems guarantee such.
C. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The computational complexity of NetShield, [2] , is O(|V|k 2 + |E|), where O(|E|) is the cost for calculating the largest eigenvalue. The computational complexity for CreateBC, [4] , is O(|V| + |E|). For ExtractProxy, because is uses the BC-SKETCH |V| |V BC |, it can be safely absorbed into the |V| term. Note that the calculation of the largest eigenvalue is not needed. We can see that for small values of k, NetShield and ExtractProxy rely on the number of vertices. But if we take k to be the number of proxies found by ExtractProxy, then NetShield grows quadratically in its complexity. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we show the results of our algorithm applied to various data sets and only show the comparison to NetShield, as it has already proven to be more effective than the other existing algorithms. For our experimental set up, we ran our algorithm, ExtractProxy, against NetShield across various undirected data sets courtesy of [49] and are listed in Table 2 . Table 3 . List of nodes selected by each algorithm.
For each dataset, we chose a budget of k = 5 as the maximum allowed number of nodes to be selected. Since it is possible for ExtractProxy to produce a selection of nodes less than k, we set NetShield to select the same number of nodes as dictated by ExtractProxy. As seen in Table 3 , only the Facebook dataset produced less than 5 nodes.
Although ExtractProxy does not require the calculation of the largest eigenvalue, in order to compare the results of the two algorithms, and run the simulation, we provide the eigenvalues before and after immunization in Table 4 . Because the epidemic thresholds as described by [6] uses the largest eigenvalue, it is clear that ExtractProxy performs slightly worse than NetShield. This is to be expected since our algorithm focuses solely on the cut nodes while NetShield looks at every node in the network.
We also simulated the virus propagation, [6] , to see how quickly the infection will subside or how many nodes will be infected in the end. We ran two simulations, once with β = .01 and δ = .7 (case 1) to ensure that s = β δ * λ max < 1 for most of the data sets. Unfortunately, due to the size of the eigenvalues for the Facebook dataset, this still gives us s > 1. We would need an extremely small birth rate coupled with a very high death rate for a virus to die out in that set.
For the second simulation, we let β = .2 and δ = .7 (case 2) to let s > 1 for every data set to see how many nodes would be infected in the end. All simulations were run over 50 time steps and averaged over 10 runs. The results are given in Figure 4 (best viewed in color).
Although our goal was to simulate the data once with the virus dissipating and once with the virus propagating, due to the size of the eigenvalues for the Facebook dataset, we would have had to set the birth rate and death rate extremely low and high, relatively. And so, in both cases, the Facebook dataset (Figures 4a, 4b) shows that the virus continues to spread. By increasing the birth rate of the virus, we can see that more nodes become infected much faster, yet ExtractProxy is able to keep less nodes from becoming infected.
For the GrQc dataset (Figures 4e, 4f ), we can see that when the virus is allowed to spread, again, ExtractProxy performs better than NetShield. Although, when we allow the virus to die out, our algorithm performs slightly worse than the other. But the difference is minuscule, in fact, the difference is on the order of 10 −5 ! One would assume that based on the eigenvalues presented in Table 4 , that there would be a big discrepancy between the two.
For the HepTh dataset (Figures 4c, 4d) , we see almost identical results for both cases with ExtractProxy being only slightly better.
VI. CONCLUSION
We provided an alternative method to the node immunization problem that does not rely on a lengthy calculation of the largest eigenvalue. We showed that for the datasets we tested, our algorithm provides comparable results when compared to the existing ones when allowing a virus to die out. We also showed that when the virus is allowed to spread, our algorithm performs better at keeping more nodes safe from infection. Our algorithm is effective at providing a set of nodes to allow for quarantining regardless the type of birth rate and decay rate. While most infections will naturally die out, there are many deadly infectious diseases that will continue to spread, and our algorithm provides a method to maximize the protection of the public should such cases occur.
While the datasets we experimented on can be considered ''small,'' the linearity of our algorithm allows us to extend our method to truly large graphs such as the various social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Google Plus, etc.), collaboration graphs (DBLP), disease transmission (immunization), and even road networks.
Future work includes taking advantage of the weight function ω by allowing certain nodes to be weighted higher, or ''more important'', than others to select a different set of nodes to ensure that important nodes are safe from infection. We would also like to apply our results to different infection models like SIR, etc.
